Guard agents that read public web forms
Zero-click data exfiltration from Salesforce Agentforce · Security incident · X · @TakSec · Oct 2026
Zenity Labs showed prompt injection placed in a public web form could make Agentforce read private account data when an employee asked it to review the lead, then leak it.
Lesson
Treat anything a customer can type as untrusted instructions, and limit which tools and data an agent can use on that content.
Fix prompt
Copy this into your own AI tool (Cursor, Lovable, Claude Code, Bolt…). It's general guidance written by us. Review what the AI suggests before applying it.
I use Salesforce Agentforce, which can read web pages, files, emails or tool output. Help me reduce the risk of prompt injection (hidden instructions in content the AI reads). 1) List what my setup can access (files, terminal, browser, MCP servers, email, databases) and what it can do without asking me. 2) Point out the riskiest combinations, e.g. reading untrusted content while also having access to secrets or the ability to send data out. 3) Suggest concrete settings: require approval for commands and network calls, remove MCP servers I don't need, use read-only tokens, and keep the tool updated. 4) Give me a short checklist to follow before opening untrusted repos or documents. Don't change anything until I've approved your plan. Never ask me to paste API keys, passwords or .env contents; tell me where to check them myself.
Source: X ↗